Only for afficionados

The cover photo of John Hume on the dust jacket of this book, together with the size of the typeface in which his name is printed, might lead the reader to presume that this is a biography of the SDLP leader. Insofar as it does not give an insight into the man behind the politician, it is not. What it does do, however, is to explore the centrality of John Hume's role in the development of the SDLP as a major political force in the northern state.

This was a book waiting to be written. The gap in research on the evolution of the SDLP was correctly identified by the author, Gerard Murray. Why this vacuum was not previously addressed can only be speculated about. Nevertheless, the book comprehensively deals with the fundamental stages of the party's development from its formation in 1970 through to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement last April.

In many respects, the author's attention to detail, his assiduous examination of the issues surrounding SDLP ideology, makes John Hume and the SDLP attractive only to party afficionados or an academic readership.

While there are a number of Murray's arguments which republicans would have difficulty with, his overall critical perspective ensures that the book does not become a hagiography. He praises John Hume's qualities and talents as a politician but also recognises his failures as a leader of a political party. Murray notes that Hume's style of leadership has created a situation in which there is a poor organisation amongst the base and the SDLP is dependent on him ``for political survival and identity.''

Indeed, as many people probably observed at the time, the persona of John Hume is so central to the very existence of the SDLP, that had he decided to run for the presidency of Ireland earlier this year the damage to the party could have been critical.

This leads to the final, and probably the most important comment that had to be made in relation to this publication; the relationship between the man and the party. This dichotomy is never fully explored and, given the title of the book, that is a disappointment.

By Tom Hartley





Recounted within the covers of this book is the fascinating story of the efforts made by both the Iraqi and US-led coalition forces to prosecute a hidden information war during the Gulf War from January to March 1991.

Taylor, in what to his great credit is a very comprehensive and widely researched piece of work, introduces the reader in depth to the idea of propaganda as an omnipresent feature of nations both at war and peace. He quotes Lord Reith (founding father of the BBC) as having pointed out that ``news is the shocktroops of propaganda''.

The author cites the ``Vietnam Syndrome'' as the US Administration's main cause of anxiety in the Gulf War (even though their forces were militarily vastly superior to those of Iraq and, also, according to pre-war polls had unprecedented levels of public support for military intervention) and the reason for their focus on the influence of media war coverage. This ``syndrome'' was the result of the same media's coverage of the Vietnamese Tet offensive in 1968, which was believed by US military commanders to have been the main reason for the eventual withdrawal of US public support for the Vietnam War.

Numerous examples are cited of the various methods used by the Allied Joint Information Bureau and the Iraqi Ministry of Information to control and influence the manner in which information was disseminated, such as the constant presence of Iraqi censors at the side of journalists, the threats made on the part of both protagonists to deny journalists visa extensions, the use of ``media pools'' (groups of heavily censored journalists who accompanied troops on operations) by coalition forces, along with many incidents of black propaganda (unattributable) and lies.

The result of this unseen battle was a resounding victory for the coalition forces and a reminder to Third World countries with notions, that in both theatres of war - the military and information - the new World Order would be victorious.

The fact that this war is remembered as having been a relatively ``clean'' war is a testament to the ability of the coalition's media managers, with the almost unanimous connivance of the western based media, to influence the general perception. For this was not a clean war (between 40,000 and 200,000 Iraqi fatalities) prosecuted using ``smart'' weapons (only 10% of the 88,500 tons were of thje ``smart'' type - the rest were of the conventional ``dumb'' type).

A highly recommended read for those who wish to investigate the role played by the media, both knowingly and perhaps at times unwittingly, in the promotion of the New World Order agenda.

By Sam Severn