Timor Loro Sae (Independent East Timor)

By Dr Robbie McVeigh

     
East Timor is not witnessing anarchy but rather state terrorism. The Indonesians created the militias; they pay the militias; they feed the militias; they control everything the militias do. There is no question that the Indonesians could stop the violence immediately if they so wished.
I HAVE just returned as part of a joint Irish/South African delegation to East Timor sponsored by the Ireland East Timor Solidarity Campaign. Our immediate aim was to play a part in ensuring that the vote on the referendum was `free and fair'; our longer term aim was to bring something positive from the Irish and South African experiences of human rights defence and reconstruction and reconciliation to Timor. The East Timor issue has grabbed world attention because of the referendum and the subsequent violence. The roots of the present conflict, however, go back centuries.

Historical background


The British supplied arms to the Indonesians throughout the genocide and continues as part of New Labour's, Tony Blair's and Robin Cook's `ethical' foreign policy - decommissioning obviously loses its appeal when it is connected to £300 million in arms trading with one of the most brutal human rights abusers in the world .
 
The island of Timor was divided and then plundered by two colonial powers: the Netherlands and Portugal. West Timor was incorporated into Indonesia following the anti-colonial struggle across the former Dutch East Indies led by Sukarno; East Timor remained a Portuguese colony until it received summary independence in 1974 following the left-wing Portuguese army coup which ended the Salazar dictatorship. This summary decolonisation resulted in a period of instability that the Indonesians (and some Timorese) call a `civil war'. In 1975, the Indonesians used this `civil war' as an excuse to invade East Timor. The Indonesian state was governed at the time by a particularly brutal dictatorship under President Suharto, who had replaced Sukarno with the aid of the Indonesian military.

Suharto's rule was characterised by a combination of repression and corruption. Indonesia subsequently annexed the territory of East Timor, although this was never recognised by the United Nations.

The key actors


From 1975 onwards, the Indonesians fought a singularly bloody war against the Timorese people. The Timorese organised through Fretilin (the pro-independence political organisation) and Falantil (the pro-independence guerrilla army). This war has been accurately characterised as a genocide in terms of the Timorese people - around 300,000 Timorese died out of a population of less than one million. But it also took its toll on the TNI (the Indonesian Army), which lost around 30,000 soldiers - there was almost no discussion or even awareness of this war in Indonesia itself because of the level of censorship and repression under Suharto. The military deaths constituted an extraordinary loss to the TNI considering that Falantil had no external support and was dependent on using weaponry captured from the Indonesian Army.

The resistance remains central to Timorese political identity - Falantil has almost mythic status among ordinary Timorese. However, it was also clear that the Falantil could not win the war against the TNI given the enormity of the odds against it. In this context, Falantil leaders - most notably Xanana Gusmao who has just been released from house arrest in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta - moved the struggle towards a broader political engagement from the early 1980s. This strategy was aided by the economic crisis in the `Tiger economies' of East Asia which precipitated the fall of Suharto. He was succeeded by President Habibie (his former deputy). This was hardly a revolution but it did represent a level of democratisation and a freeing up of censorship. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the UN, Habibie announced that he would allow a vote on greater autonomy for East Timor.

Towards Independence


Habibie also announced that if autonomy was rejected, it would be taken as a vote for independence (This remains the case - the Timorese technically voted against autonomy not for independence on 31 August). This rather bizarre formula was registered with the UN in the agreement of 5 May 1999 which was underwritten by the Indonesians and the Portuguese, as the former colonial power. It resulted in the UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Timor) mission which oversaw the recent ballot. The fundamental flaw in the UN mandate, however, was that it left responsibility for security in the hands of the Indonesians. Fretilin and other smaller groups formed the CNRT as a pro-independence coalition; the Indonesians instructed all government employees to support autonomy and began to form the loyalist pro-integration militias.

The Current Situation


Our visit made certain things very clear.

First, whatever the pragmatism of the present Indonesian political leadership, the Indonesian military are not prepared to disengage from East Timor. The army is largely protected from the international pressures which made Habibie offer the referendum in the first place (although it bears emphasis that the TNI remains heavily dependent on military hardware from the West). It lost a huge number of people in the war against Falantil. It also sees East Timor (perhaps correctly) as the first stage in the collapse of the Indonesian state. Certainly, the Indonesian state looks fragile - there are daily pro-democracy protests in Jakarta; there is already a separatist guerrilla struggle in Aceh in Sumatra; there are serious religious conflicts in Ambon; West Papua, which was occupied illegally in much the same way as East Timor, continues its own liberation struggle. In this context, the TNI represents itself as the only force capable of maintaining `law and order' and national unity. This, however, makes recent press reports of `anarchy' in East Timor all the more ridiculous. East Timor is not witnessing anarchy but rather state terrorism. The Indonesians created the militias; they pay the militias; they feed the militias; they control everything the militias do. There is no question that the Indonesians could stop the violence immediately if they so wished.

We were particularly moved by the dignity of Timorese people in the face of this violence. We visited the small hill town of Laeremo in Liquica Regency during a UN voter education session based on a play called `The Devil Comes To Vote'. This was the UN at its very best. There was a palpable sense of people on the threshold of democracy. Although this has been corrupted by subsequent events, there was something profoundly moving about participating in a process where people had access to democracy for the first time. Whatever horrors the Indonesians are about to unleash on the Timorese, there is some comfort in knowing that those people who walked around with broad smiles whispering `Viva Xanana', because they had started to believe that the vote was actually going to happen, will win in the end. Not because they are stronger, but because they have justice and democracy and right on their side.

The Future


The immediate future looks incredibly bleak for the East Timorese. The Indonesian strategy looks increasingly like a return to genocide. They may repeat the events of 1975 - withdraw and then re-invade East Timor when their militias have created enough evidence of another `civil war'. They may partition East Timor - conceding independence to the Eastern half but retaining control of the Western half. In the longer term, however, there is still hope. Despite frightening levels of harassment and intimidation from the Indonesians and the militias, the Timorese people voted overwhelmingly for independence. That vote cannot be taken away. The situation in Timor is now on the world stage. The Indonesians may have successfully intimidated the world's media out of Timor but it will be difficult for the Indonesians ever to return to situation in which the rest of the world turned its back on genocide. In this context, there is a particular onus on all those Western governments which colluded in the genocide to make reparation for that history. Almost every Western government bears heavy responsibility: the Australian government (under Gough Whitlam of all people) gave the green light to the illegal occupation and subsequently recognized the illegal annexation; the US also signalled acceptance of the occupation and subsequently supplied napalm which was used in the genocide; the British supplied arms to the Indonesians throughout the genocide - most notoriously Hawk aircraft. This policy of supplying Hawks and other military hardware continues as part of New Labour's, Tony Blair's and Robin Cook's `ethical' foreign policy - decommissioning obviously loses its appeal when it is connected to £300 million in arms trading with one of the most brutal human rights abusers in the world .

The Importance of Solidarity


When we met with Xanana under house arrest he impressed on us the continuing importance of international solidarity. The shameful record of collusion in genocide should place an ever greater moral imperative on the international community to act in defence of the East Timorese people. There is a need for an immediate withdrawal of all Indonesian forces and the immediate deployment of a UN peace-keeping force from non-aligned countries. Ireland has a positive record of solidarity with the Timorese people but this places an extra duty upon all progressive forces in the island to do everything they can in solidarity. There is a particular responsibility on us to make sure that Blowpipe missiles - produced locally in Shorts - are not used against the Timorese. It is a defining feature of genocide that it is almost immediately followed by an international chorus of `We didn't know'. It is important to insist this time we all do know. If genocide happens, the Indonesian military will be immediately and directly responsible - they should already be under investigation for war crimes and other crimes against humanity. Those governments who armed the Indonesian military, however, bear the heaviest responsibility - there is a particular onus on them to ensure that the threatened genocide does not occur.


Mexico: Government agent incites civil war


By Nick Martin-Clarke in Chiapas, Mexico

WE ENTER the village of Morelia in a tropical rainstorm, with water falling in sheets from the skies and coursing down the hillsides, churning the soil into mud. Visibility's poor, and we almost run into a group of men carrying .22 rifles on the football pitch. Fortunately, the ``compas'' guiding us spot them first and we manage to stay out of sight until they have passed.

Morelia is a divided community of Tzeltal-indians in the middle of a war-zone in south-east Mexico. About half of the population are clients of the PRI, Mexico's ruling party. The other half are grassroots supporters of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. The split runs between cousins, sisters and brothers, parents and their children. It's not a situation which makes for particularly harmonious relations, and external factors have began to seriously exacerbate the problem.

An influx of young people into the village has given the government a slim majority in assemblies, and its counter-insurgent strategies are especially geared to provoking tension and social division. The result is a spate of murders within indigenous communities as the levels of friction are deliberately augmented. A number of PRI agents travel around the conflict area, promising cash grants and gifts of cattle to anyone who agrees to leave the Zapatista organization.

One such agent is Juan Villafuerte, whose white Chevrolet pick-up is a frequent sight in communities around the Morelia region. In Morelia his principal objective appears to be to find a pretext to create an army camp within the village. There are already thousands of soldiers based only six miles down the road.

When the Zapatistas walked through Morelia to attend a recent demonstration, some hotheads shouted insults at the PRI supporters. The following day, six of the local EZLN leaders were called in and informed that they would have to spend a day in the village jail and pay a fine of 50 pesos each.

It soon became clear that there was no intention of releasing them. PRI representatives also called at the international peace camp and told the human rights observers working there that they had an hour to leave the village. There were rumours of an attack on the Aguascalientes, one of five meeting spaces contructed on Zapatista territory, and located only half a mile down the road. The scene was set for a serious clash that would benefit nobody but the government.

The Zapatistas moved fast. The next day, one thousand unarmed guerrilla members marched into town and freed the six imprisoned leaders. A rota involving several thousand civilians was established in order to defend the Aguascalientes around the clock. They also began to stop all vehicles using the road out of Morelia, keeping a special lookout for Juan Villafuerte's Chevrolet.

The village is still extremely tense, but for the moment it looks like round one has gone to the rebels.