US foreign policy interests determine which elections are valid

By Dara MacNeil

As part of its campaign to destabilise Sandinista Nicaragua in the 1980s, the United States repeatedly called on the country's leaders to hold what they termed ``free and fair elections.''

In 1984, the Sandinistas did just that and secured an overwhelming victory at the polls - winning some 70% of all votes cast. International observers, including a number from this country, unanimously declared that the elections had indeed met the criteria established by the US and had been ``free and fair.''

Alone in the international community, the US ignored the result and in an act of stunning audacity its government actually pretended that no elections had taken place at all. Successive US administrations continued to refer to Nicaragua's democratically elected government as a ``junta.''

However in 1990, the US achieved the result it wanted when the Sandinistas were ousted by the US-financed UNO coalition. Predictably, the result was duly recognised and the election hailed as a `triumph for democracy'. To this day history, as recorded by the White House and its acolytes, deems that nothing of significance took place in Nicaragua prior to 1990.

Similarly, the US claims that its opposition to the Cuban regime is rooted, not in ideology, but in that country's failure to hold ``free and fair'' elections. Repeatedly, they stress that the outcome of any such election would be respected by Washington. With one major exception. Current US law states that should Cuba comply with US wishes and hold such an election tomorrow, and should it be won by either Fidel or Raul Castro, such an outcome would not be recognised as ``free and fair.'' It would, like the Nicaraguan experience, become an election that never was.

However such democratic concerns do not arise in the case of Indonesia. A valued western ally strategically-located in South East Asia, the country has also proved a lucrative location for Western investors.

Apart from having the worst human rights record in the post-war world, Indonesia is also a functioning dictatorship, headed by the notoriously bloodthirsty General Suharto. The General came to power in a 1965 coup which was accompanied by the slaughter of 500,000 Indonesians, many of whom were members - or suspected members - of the country's communist party. The CIA provided Suharto with much of the information he required to carry out his purge. A former CIA operative has talked about ``the steps the agency (CIA) took to create the conditions that led to the massacre of at least half a million Indonesians.''

Indonesia, however, does hold elections. Of a sort. Thus, since 1965 General Suharto has never once been defeated by an opposition candidate for the post of President. Supporters of the old dictator - such as his admirers in the West - cite this fact as an illustration of Suharto's enduring popularity among his people.

Equally, in defence of the regime, they point to other examples of functioning Indonesian democracy, such as the regular elections for the country's parliament, the most recent of which concluded at the end of May.

Here, Suharto's ruling Golkar Party won an estimated 74% of the vote and, according to media reports ``crushed the opposition.''

Golkar was reported to have increased its share of the vote by 6% over its 1992 showing. Even Golkar deputies, media reports assured us, were surprised by their party's strong showing.

However, they failed to mention a number of salient points about the Indonesian electoral system. For example, opposition parties are strictly regulated by law and none can exist without the assent of General Suharto.

They also need his endorsement to contest elections. A similar system applies to Presidential elections, with the regime carefully picking candidates to `challenge' General Suharto. Indonesia's jails are filled with those who are at variance with his concept of democracy.

As a result, the Indonesian `opposition' is both created and maintained by the regime. Its function (as determined by Suharto) is to simply add an electoral, legitimising gloss to a system of dictatorship. The existence of a loyal opposition also helps forestall criticism from human rights groups and their ilk.

In addition, the country's 500 seat parliament does not actually have the power to do anything but consent to Presidential decisions and decrees. Last year, the regime engineered the removal of Megawati Sukarnoputri as head of the officially-approved `opposition' Indonesian Democratic Party.

It appears Sukarnoputri took her role as an `opposition' leader a little more seriously than the government intended.

However, even with the odds stacked in its favour the regime is not averse to a little cheating in order to ensure the desired result. A report on the May elections concluded they had been marked by ``systematic violations'', including multiple voting, intimidation and procedural irregularities.

Meanwhile, as this farce was being played out, with not a hint of criticism from the Western champions of democracy, the true face of the Indonesian regime was revealed in neighbouring, occupied East Timor. As the votes were still being counted, Indonesian troops rounded up dozens of young East Timorese, following a rebel attack which left four Indonesian soldiers dead. By way of reprisal, the soldiers executed 16 young people - four for every soldier killed. Thus far, democracy Indonesian-style has failed to attract even a tiny proportion of the odium heaped upon either Nicaragua or Cuba.