The Department for Reunification

BY Justin Moran

"An effort should be made to collect public opinion and allow a nationwide and bipartisan discussion on the issue of unification. The government will set the goal and guidelines of its unification policy based on national consensus. It is evident that unification cannot be achieved overnight. With a long-term outlook we need to make preparation for unification by building up national strength while adjusting ourselves to developments at home and abroad."

Those are the words we should hear, but most likely never will, from the Fianna Fáil Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern to kickstart the debate on the practicalities of unification. The self-styled 'Republican Party', with a lingering commitment to national unity and independence, has been in power for 55 years out of the almost 80 since its foundation yet seems little closer to realising it has a role to play in planning for re-unification.

But those are the words of Park Chung-hee, President of South Korea, at the foundation of the Korean Ministry for Reunification almost 40 years ago, and barely a decade after a bitter war between North and South Korea left almost three million dead. There can hardly have been a less auspicious time to begin the process of planning for unification.

The Ministry was founded with the agreement of all the South Korean political parties in a spirit of non-partisanship. It was stated at the time, and is still admitted, that unification is not on the cards for the foreseeable future but there was general agreement that a roadmap should be prepared for when the time comes.

It also served the benefit of centralising in one department the various unification policies pursued by the Government so that there was a Minister at Cabinet level driving the unification agenda and ensuring that other Ministries were aware of their responsibilities.

The Ministry is not without its critics, however. The North Korean government has pointed out that two of its functions include assessing the economic, military and social situation in North Korea, as well as providing support for defectors.

Refuting charges of spying, the Ministry claims that research on North Korea is essential in planning for unification and that their role in providing support for defectors is purely humanitarian. The suspicion, and not just limited to North Koreans, of close links between the Ministry and the South Korean intelligence services, remains, however.

The cornerstone of the unification policy is The Policy for Peace and Prosperity, which aims to "lay the foundation for a peaceful unification of Korea through the promotion of peace on the Korean peninsula and to achieve mutual prosperity of South and North Korea."

The policy is economically driven, with a vision of a unified Korea connecting Eurasia with the Pacific Ocean. Prosperity reinforces peace, or so the theory goes. The notion is that if the North Koreans can be convinced of the economic benefits they are more likely to work to dismantle the barriers between their two countries.

Part of this drive for peace includes South Korea holding out the possibility of massive economic support if the North abandons its nuclear weapons programme. Once the nuclear issue is resolved, the current armistice agreement can be replaced with a conclusive peace deal, followed by demilitarisation on both sides of the border. This openness would lead to the creation of a 'Northeast Asian Business Hub', the prosperity part of the deal.

Under this part of the plan, not only would the South Koreans provide economic assistance, but would pressure other countries to do the same and develop special economic zones (so North Koreans too can have the joy of sweatshop working) in the North. Expansion of inter-Korean cooperation in the economic and energy sectors will ultimately, so it is hoped, lead to the creation of an inter-Korean economic community with its own dynamic for unity.

The Ministry funds an Institute for Political Education for Unification and an Office of South-North Dialogue. The Institute trains and educates experts and administrators for the challenges of unification, as well as providing educational support for schools and social organisations. The latter body develops negotiations strategies for dialogue between the two governments as well as administering the discussions between the two states at all levels.

It is also responsible for providing assistance to dislocated North Koreans, who either defected or were made refugees during the Korean War, and orchestrating transport and traffic between the two states. It publishes a weekly newsletter on unification related issues and events in North Korea

And yet despite all this planning, thinking, policy creation and effort, unification of the Korean peninsula is neither inevitable, nor even likely. The most militarised border on earth separates the two states. South Koreans living in the sprawling capital of Seoul are well aware that they are two minutes flying time from forward North Korean airbases who could be bombing their city before its citizens even knew the war had started.

North and South Korea are separated by a demilitarised zone (DMZ) stretching over 151 miles across the peninsula and 2.5 miles wide. Most of the South's 650,000-strong military and the North's 1.1-million strong armed forces, the world's fifth largest, are deployed in and around the DMZ, along with tens of thousands of US forces. Such is the paranoia on both sides of the border that North Korea remains one of the most closed countries in the world and the South Koreans build their motorways big enough that they can be used as alternate runways for fighters in time of war.

It is only twelve years since the last of four tunnels was discovered, two kilometres long and 150 metres below the surface, just south of the DMZ. A North Korean defector revealed its existence and the tunnels are wide enough to allow an armoured division, roughly 30,000 troops, to pass under the DMZ in an hour. These troops would open up a second front behind the DMZ at the outbreak of war. While four have been found so far, no one in South Korea thinks they have found all of them.

Outside the Korean War Museum in Seoul hangs a huge banner, The Korean War — It Still Goes On. It refers to the fact that though a ceasefire took place on 27 July 1953, no formal peace treaty has ever been signed between the two governments. In effect, they remain officially at war, with a ceasefire in place for over 50 years.

In such circumstances unification can at times seem like a pipedream.

But while the likelihood of reunification in the near future is minimal, Koreans are aware that five years before German re-unification in 1990, nobody thought it was a possibility in their lifetimes. Whenever, or if ever, unification takes place the Koreans plan to be as prepared for it as they can possibly be. A lesson that Bertie Ahern and the 'Republican Party' would do well to learn.