A sense of duty

Book review

‘Robert Barton – A Remarkable Revolutionary’ 

by Chris Lawlor. Published by History Press

This book leads us to retrace from yet another angle the course of the disastrous negotiations that led to the ‘Articles of Agreement’, the Treaty signed in London on 6 December 1921.

How disastrous those negotiations really were became very clear in the Dáil speech of one of the signatories – Robert Barton, the subject of this biography.

Remarkably, Robert Barton, having been basically coerced into signing the Treaty, felt a duty to support it and vote for it in the Dáil debate. But, his duty to his fellow signatories fulfilled, he campaigned against the Treaty and took the Republican side in the Civil War six months after the Dáil vote. Indecision? Vacillation? I don’t think so, as this biography shows that Barton was essentially consistent and never ceased to regret that he had signed the ill-fated document in Downing Street.

Barton was impelled by his sense of duty to Irish independence. That brought him in the space of two years from a role as a British Army officer, to a Home Ruler to a Republican. He was a diligent and effective  Minister in the First Dáil Éireann, a daring escaper from Mountjoy Jail, a recaptured political prisoner, and a member of the negotiating team sent to London by the Dáil in the autumn of 1921.

Barton was politically close to Éamon de Valera but was not afraid to challenge him when necessary. He challenged his decision not to lead the delegation to London. Dev’s absence is the first of the many perplexing issues around the Treaty that are still hotly debated. While Dev made an argument for his absence, it was surely outweighed by contrary arguments which Barton certainly put. Devotees of Michael Collins still promote the conspiracy theory that Dev stayed away because he knew the type of Treaty that would emerge and he wanted to put Collins in the wrong. This, in my view, is fantasy and is contradicted by any close study of the events, study that is enhanced by this book.

In his Dáil speech Barton described how Lloyd George successfully used the threat of immediate war to get the Irish side to sign the Treaty. Barton himself was prepared to face war but could not in conscience commit others to it. Still, he resisted signing to the last minute and he was in turn coerced by Griffith, Collins and Duggan who became conduits for Lloyd George’s threat.

Did all or any of them believe the threat would be carried out? Another perennial question still hotly debated. For Griffith I believe it was immaterial because he believed strongly in the Treaty more than any of the others. Collins believed he could use it to get more. And it was Griffith and Collins who dominated the delegation and did most of the talking with the British. They froze out Robert Barton, Gavan Duffy and Erskine Childers.

A divided Irish delegation was further divided and out-negotiated by the British. And the threat of war was the final blow. It was a tragic error on the Irish side that they failed to expose the threat. It was not negotiation at that stage, it was dictation under duress, and the Irish side should have withdrawn and made public the British tactics.

Having secured the advantage that night in London, the British pressed it and never ceased to press it until they had forced Civil War in the 26 Counties and consolidated the Orange State in the Six Counties.

Barton went on to support Dev and Fianna Fáil, though he never joined that party. He was appointed to senior positions in key State bodies, most notably Bórd na Móna. He lived on his family’s West Wicklow estate and Chris Lawlor, the foremost local historian of that part of the country, brings much local interest and colour to this biography. It is long overdue, well deserved and recommended reading.