Struggle is a continuing process

Whether you're in favour of the Belfast Agreement or not, there's no doubt but that Good Friday 1998 was an historic day for the Irish people. The hopes awakened by that Agreement have, of course, soured considerably in the face of continuing unionist obstruction and obfuscation, but no alternative has yet been proposed that offers any convincing prospect of making better progress.

The assumption, however, that tends to flow from this is that the Agreement, as it finally emerged, is almost a sacred text, which was the inevitable conclusion of the deliberations of any well-intentioned group of people.

The reality is different. While important progress was made in putting the issue of equality and parity of esteem on the agenda, as subsequent events have shown this has not guaranteed that equality. And much of what is contained in the Agreement reflects the balance of power between the various participants in the discussions and negotiations.

Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Agreement, Sinn Féin's chief negotiator, Martin Mc Guinness, made the point that if people wanted an Agreement that would reflect more of the republican agenda, they would have to work to ensure a stronger republican mandate by getting more votes for the party's candidates.

For we must never forger that the other participants had different agendas. This is obvious in relation to the unionists and to the British government, both of which were determined on limiting the concessions made to Irish democracy; but it was also true of both the SDLP and Dublin government. Dublin in particular was quite prepared to make a historic compromise with Ulster Unionism that would leave them in local domination, while limiting cross-border 'interference' to non-contentious areas.

It is in this context that Déaglán de Bréadún's book is most valuable. It is not a work of analysis, but that is strangely its strength, for it lets the facts emerge and speak for themselves. The book, in fact, is a step by step account of the various twists and turns in the process of getting the peace process on the road, and bringing about the Good Friday Agreement itself.

The account is strengthened by his heavy reliance on the day to day reports which he filed at the time. In this way we get a privileged immediate view, and one invaluable filtered through the prism of hindsight as well.

On the downside, there are so many twists and turns in the tale that many readers will get tired before the end; but for historians and contemporary political commentators this is an invaluable resource, and de Bréadúin's book will be the major point of reference for decades to come.

The first point worth drawing attention to is the consequence of Sinn Féin's exclusion from the talks during the period when the ground rules were being worked out. Later on the limited agenda objectives set b the SDLP and the Dublin government were to prevent stronger linkages between North and South.

The second point is how weak Dublin was in actually pursing the cross-border context, while the SDLP come across as being content with a token reference. The latter were really interested in power-sharing within Northern Ireland, and never pushed the North-South context at all.

The most shaming point to emerge from the Bréadúin's account is that the British government was actually prepared to concede more on the cross-border bodies, risking the need to confront Unionist wrath, but that it was Dublin that pulled back and settled for a very anodyne set of proposals.

It is no accident that the only cross-border areas where any real vigour has been put in, apart from tourism, have been health and education, where Sinn Féin ministers help set the agenda. The nearest other area is economic development co-operation, where the UUP's Reg Empey is in Charge. SDLP dominated areas are as quiet as their DUP counterparts.

The final point of major significance to come through is how Dublin, not just under Bruton but also under Ahern, played its part in fanning the flames of the decommissioning non-issue. What should have been a side issue, allowed to wither away in significance, was continually pushed back into centre stage by Dublin Governments which refused to face down either the Unionists or the British on the question, despite the glaring fact that, ironically, even to this day, Fianna Fáil has never decommissioned or explained what happened to the guns they carried into Leinster House when they won the election of 1932.

The point comes back to the admonishment given by McGuinness in the aftermath of the Agreement. There could have been a more Republican agreement, there can be a more Republican agreement, there can be a more Republican character in future developments - but this depends on strengthening the Republican vote in elections North and South. For there is, of course, no final settlement until foreign interference in Irish affairs ceases, and until the Irish people - Catholic and Protestant, from nationalist or unionist tradition - are united in a genuine Republic.

What this book ultimately shows us is that struggle is a continuing process, and that we're still in the early stages of the game.

BY EOIN Ó MURCHÚ